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Abstract 
The global geopolitical rift has presented challenges as Russia's revisionism policy, a 
spread of Islamic extremism and terrorism, instability in Eastern and Southern 
neighbourhood causing migration crisis, the rise of ultranationalist populism igniting 
Euro-scepticism. The situation requires a coherent and comprehensive approach from 
the European Union, however, we observe the lack of motivation and sufficient 
instruments to react. The European security initiatives finally resulted into Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), however, Europeans inability to deliver an 
effective response to existing challenges is encapsulated into impediments derived from 
differences of views and goals of leading EU members. Therefore this work is designed 
to explore European security and defence initiative focusing on problem why CSDP 
failed to expand and develop deeper, and respond to the research question what are 
such a wide differences of views on CSDP of leading European countries such as the 
UK, France and Germany? Our tasks in the dissertation are at first to identify major 
strategic divergences of leading EU member states such as the UK, France, and 
Germany and secondly to identify and describe key factors that have contributed to 
those strategic divergences. To respond stated research tasks within dissertation has 
been used case study method exploring three EU state to see differences in their 
motivations and goals and trace the process in order to identify key ruptures which 
facilitated impediments to European security initiative. During research, we identified 
stumbling blocks which have been generalised into conclusion. It emphasises major 
problem of post-World War II European order inherited in modernity where the USA 
holds hegemonic power and plays the decisive role in foreign and security affairs of 
Europe preventing the emergence of European power core. The nature of EU and its 
internal settings are also causing for the imperfection of system which cannot overcome 
obstruction and develop the common defence. In addition, some states perceive 
European integration in foreign and security area as a threat to own sovereignty 
inducing them to act it in opposition.  
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CHAPTER 1 
1.1 Introduction 
Is the EU able and willing to develop Common Security Defence Policy (CSDP) as an 
effective instrument and if so what conditions are obstructing the process?  These 
questions will be the focus of this thesis. The topic of EU’s security became most 
relevant after Russia’s aggressive revisionism resulting into the occupation of Crimea, 
and emergence and expansion of Islamic State extrapolating terrorism in Europe.  
After attacks in Paris, the first time in the history of the EU France evoked the mutual 
assistance/defence clause CSDP article 42(7). During several days Europe was united in 
support of France, however, everything has been gradually watered down. Once more it 
became clear how diverse sovereign interests of European capitals have a negative 
effect on European security supporting only its illusory meaning.  
Why did EU Commission’s President Jean-Claude Junker’s idea supporting the creation 
of European armed forces to address EU’s political relevance1 caused fierce criticism 
from the UK’s Conservative party spokesman on defence and security retired General 
Geoffrey Van Orden. He criticised initiative as being damaging British national 
interests and commented on the issue ”This relentless drive towards a European army 
must stop. ... However, the EU's defence ambitions are detrimental to our national 
interest, to NATO, and to the close alliances that Britain has with many countries 
outside the EU – not least the United States, Gulf allies, and many Commonwealth 
countries” 2.    
The development of European defence instruments seems logical in the context of 
gradual integration resulting into some degree of political unity and economic strength 
creating preconditions for further increase of power. This reason acquires more weight 
particularly in the context of the revival of turbulence in Eastern and Southern 
neighbourhood of EU. Many political and economic factors facilitated institutional and 
capability developments, however, it developed neither effective nor autonomous 
instrument relevant to the existing environment. The dissertation is intending to study 
the case of CSDP phenomena and factors affecting to its level of development. 
                                                          
1  Das Sontag 8 March 2015 
2 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/08/jean-claude-juncker-calls-for-eu-army-european-
commission-miltary 
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Within dissertation, we scrutinise frontrunners of European security the UK, France and 
Germany to find out their role from the initial phase and further effect on the existing 
condition of CSDP. 
For the UK it was way to stay in play on European affairs while refusing to participate 
in other areas of European integration facing threat to appear on margins. Britain was 
motivated by the possibility to control rules from inside to protect own national 
interests, also ensure NATO’s role intact and secure US’s presence in European foreign 
and security policy.  
For France European security and defence initiative was a possibility to play a vital role 
in European affairs, exert own influence reducing American grip on the continent and 
alternate absolute dependence on NATO as security instrument. However, preserving 
own sovereignty in foreign, security and defence policy by channelling process into the 
intergovernmental format.  
For Germany, it was a chance to play a central role in concentrating European power 
under foreign and security policy and give clout to EU play global role same time being 
restrained itself by domestic settings. 
Further member states discovered that they have also common interests involved which 
would facilitate domestic economies. Cooperation under security defence auspices 
would give impetus to defence industry creating such capabilities which could resist to 
American defence giants.  
The following dissertation is organised into five chapters, first, is Introduction providing 
a general historical overview of the development process, introduces its drivers. The 
second chapter offers theoretical framework applied through the dissertation, defines 
problem statement, research tasks, methodology how research will be organised and 
operationalisation with the elaboration of hypothesis and discussing pursued variables. 
The third chapter will provide an empirical analysis of documents, the Fourth chapter 
synthesises our findings and the fifth chapter will offer the conclusion. 
1.2 Historical overview of ESDP/CSDP development 
European Security development is going back to the first Franco-British Defence Treaty 
of the Dunkirk in 1947, followed by Treaty of the Brussels in 1948. In 1948 based on 
defence orientated Treaty of Brussels has been established the Western European Union 
(WEU) grouping members of EU and NATO. However, it remained institutionally 
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underdeveloped with limited influence. Most of its activities were effectively phased 
out in 1999 and transferred to EU followed by its dissolution in 2011. In 1949 has been 
established North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) collective defence alliance 
which superseded all existed treaties and underwrote European security during the Cold 
War and beyond. The security guarantee was provided mostly by the United States, 
which rapidly assumed the hegemonic position in the alliance. In 1950 France 
introduced the idea of Common European Defence, however, in 1954 French 
Parliament rejected ratification of the agreement. Another French initiative voiced by  
President Charles de Gaulle In 1961 was Fouchet plan as part of the own grand design 
for Europe which failed to start. Until the end of Cold War European security issue was 
related to NATO, however, new era triggered different process including establishment 
of European Union. Maastricht Treaty establishing European Union (TEU) 1992/1993 
laid the ground for further and deeper institutionalisation conceptualising European 
foreign affairs establishing Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) which foresaw the 
future framing of common defence policy that could lead to a common defence.  
Changed environment and Balkan crisis aggregated EU states to use CFSP framework 
in order to start developing its defence dimension. The periodical Intergovernmental 
Conferences (IGC) in mid-nineties addressed a number of issues in foreign, security and 
defence area facilitated by France and Germany. Their initiative had important 
implications on other members attracting their support or contrary discontent3.  The 
Franco-German initiative has been gradually promoted via series of EU Council 
meetings. 
The Treaty of Amsterdam 19974 introduced amendments facilitating the creation of 
defence policy which considered the creation of common defence5(TEU Art.26). Also, 
they created the position for High Representative for Common Foreign and Security 
Policy. In 1997 change of political spectrum of the UK triggered its new Labour 
                                                          
3 White Paper on the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference, Volume II. Germany, I. Basic positions of the 
Federal Government with regard to the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference.  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/igc1996/pos-de_en.htm                                                                               
White Paper on the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference, Volume II. France.  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/igc1996/pos-fr_en.htm  
 
4 adopted in 1997 entered into force in May 1999 
5 Part One Substantive amendments Amsterdam Treaty 
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Government of Tony Blair to change its position in regards to European security6. This 
important shift leads to Saint-Malo Franco-British Declaration 4 December 1998. In 
1998 UK Prime Minister Tony Blair and President of France Jacque Chirac met to 
discuss European security and defence matters in Saint-Malo, France. They signed 
Letter of Intent (LOI) on Franco-British Defence cooperation and issued Joint 
Declaration on European Defence. The LOI included “Cooperation in crisis 
management and operations” aimed to establish cooperation allowing implementation 
of joint military operations within and beyond NATO territory where NATO is not 
taking lead7. However, most important breakthrough was Joint Declaration on European 
Defence stating that ”Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up 
by credible military forces”8  this was an unprecedented step to frame European security 
aspirations independently from US (Howorth, J. 2014.p 7). From Saint-Malo France 
was expecting to achieve EU security and defence autonomy while the Britain was 
expecting that European capabilities development would facilitate to become better 
partners in NATO. The Franco-British initiative attracted other EU countries, a week 
later at the Vienna European Council 11-12 December the other member states 
indicated support for the initiative. The Saint-Malo declaration caused cautious attention 
and alert in the USA. Official position of Washington has been enunciated by US 
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in her speech preventing Europeans from 
Decoupling from NATO, Duplication of defence capabilities and Discrimination of 
non-EU NATO members like Turkey or Norway to participate in operations9. 
According to Jolyon Howorth before Saint-Malo meeting, Washington was 
persuading London to have influence on Europeans to increase their burden share on 
                                                          
6 Informal EU summit in October 1998 in the Pörtschach, Austria. Austrian Presidency Informal Summit 
Press Conference, Downing Street website at http://www.number- 10.gov.uk  
7 UK/French Letter of Intent on Cooperation in Crisis Management and Operations. 
8 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/French-
British%20Summit%20Declaration,%20Saint-Malo,%201998%20-%20EN.pdf 
9 "First, we want to avoid decoupling: NATO is the expression of the indispensable transatlantic link. 
It should remain an organisation of sovereign allies, where European decision-making is not 
unhooked from broader alliance decision-making. Second, we want to avoid duplication: defence 
resources are too scarce for allies to conduct force planning, operate command structures, and make 
procurement decisions twice-once at NATO and once more at the EU. And third, we want to avoid any 
discrimination against NATO members who are not EU members."(Albright, 1998) 
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own security10. The US position has continued impact on European capitals for all 
way on of development Saint-Malo initiative. Still, Saint-Malo declaration launched 
process involving rounds of EU Council meetings and intergovernmental interaction 
of member states. 
Following EU council in Cologne (3-4 June 1999) laid the ground for an institutional 
framework with the further emphasis on creating capabilities. It established The 
General Affairs Council (GAC) - forum for regular meetings of the foreign and when 
appropriate defence ministers, The Political and Security Committee (PSC) - the 
permanent entity hosting representatives at ambassador level with political/military 
experts located in the Brussels; the EU Military Committee hosting military 
representatives for making recommendations to the PSC; and the EU Military Staff 
including situation centre. During Cologne Council, former NATO Secretary General 
Javier Solana has been appointed to the position of HR for CFSP being the ideal 
candidate to reduce Washington’s fears about “Decoupling”.  
Next European council meeting in Helsinki (10-11 December 1999) defined the 
scope of military headline goals.  The Helsinki European Council agreed upon force 
size(60.000), structure, the range of operational tasks and technical characteristics. 
They negotiated its institutional and legal underpinning, modalities for cooperation 
with NATO and principles for participation into operations for non-EU member 
countries and decision making11. However, it considered Washington’s position and 
newer pursued goal to lay ground for autonomous European Army12. Next important 
step became Berlin Plus agreement (1999-2003) EU’s advancement with its ESDP 
project required formalisation of cooperation with Alliance, for that reason has been 
decided to use WEU and NATO arrangement inaugurated in Berlin1996. The "Plus" 
in Berlin Plus agreement is the reference to the fact that NATO-EU arrangements are 
seen in the context of evolution WEU-NATO 1996 Berlin agreement13.  The Berlin 
Plus agreement established EU-NATO interaction framework including availability 
                                                          
10 Author refers to the former British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) official who confirm 
Washington’s desire to stimulate British officials to engage in close cooperation with European leaders 
"we would not have touched Saint-Malo with a bargepole". (Howorth, 2014: 52-53). 
11 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/acfa4c.htm 
12 Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council 10 and 11 December 1999, Chapter II, paragraph 
27 
 
13 Merlingen, M, Ostrauskaite, R. Gascone, G. 2008, p-144.  2008 European Security and Defence Policy 
and Implementation Perspective. 
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of NATO's capabilities for EU-led operations, assignment of Deputy Supreme Allied 
Command Europe (DSACEUR)14 for commanding EU-led operations allocating to 
him new operational staff and support mechanism from EU15 and political 
supervisory body in EU16. First results of Berlin Plus agreement made EU capable of 
launching its first-ever military operation within CSDP framework, operation 
"Concordia"2003 in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and 
“Althea”2004 in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Next step was Lisbon EU Council 2009 
which in many respects was important in regards to European security the Lisbon 
Treaty sought to strengthen foreign and external security policy. It rearranged High 
Representative's position, changed the name of ESDP on CSDP and allocated to it 
the separate section in the TEU and finally, it broadened the potential policy scope of 
CFSP and CSDP.  
The interval from autumn 1998 through the end of 1999 was the most significant in the 
history of EU in developing its defence and security policy. During this period was 
achieved most progress focusing on military capabilities development. Actions 
produced expectations that it will end up with something more than just policy and 
institution. After Helsinki European Council framework of institutional and military 
aspects of ESDP was clearly defined. In 2000-2002 ESDP focused on capabilities 
development. Considerable progress has been achieved in 2000, however, during 2001 
overall situation became more complicated since the US launched the global war on 
terror.  
Since then about 33 missions and operations contributing to stabilisation and security in 
Europe and neighbouring countries has been launched in a duration of 2003-2014. 
Under Civilian Headline Goals capacity buildings have brought its results, the missions 
initially including Police, strengthening the rule of law, empowerment of civilian 
administration and civil protection later extended to monitoring and strengthening EU 
Special Representative (EUSR) offices exceeded expectations. The geography of 
missions initially launched from Western Balkans spans to the South Caucasus, from 
Africa to the Middle East and Asia. The scope of operations has greatly diversified in 
the strengthening actions in police and the wider rule of law sector, monitoring borders 
                                                          
 
15 http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-csdp/berlin/index_en.htm 
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and peace agreements. The demand on the Petersberg tasks military component is 
decreasing giving way to civilian missions.  EU managed to find its niche as being a 
primary asset for post-conflict reconstruction and civilian mission's enforcer in various 
crises.  
1.3 Drivers behind ESDP 
In this section referring to J.Howorth’s Security and Defence Policy in the European 
Union, we underline several drivers underpinning early ESDP initiative. The process 
has been stimulated by different developments within the historical context. 
At first end of Cold War changed Western priorities to sustain the massive force, it also 
caused US’s strategic interest shift from Europe to Asia-pacific. During 25 years 1988-
2004 France reduced its military capabilities by 44%, Germany by 42% and the UK by 
35%, dramatic downsize was followed by defence budgets reduction. Post Cold War 
European defence reduction and US’s shift in Asia-Pacific caused extensive power 
vacuum which had to be filled by Europeans. (Howorth, J. 2007.pp 95-101). 
The second driver developed as a result of EU defining itself as a normative power for 
the definition of own identity and promoting own values worldwide. Thus EU had to 
react to security challenges in its close neighbourhood Balkans, South Caucasus, and 
the Middle East to uphold its world image. Europe’s new role required adequate 
instruments to react on conflicts. ESDP was a salvation of the alliance since NATO's 
heavy-set was not adequate to respond crisis.  
The third driver derived as a result of wars in Balkans in the 1990s that pressured 
European states to develop own security agenda. It was clear that sooner or later Balkan 
states will become members of EU as being part of geographical Europe.  
The fourth driver appeared as a result EU’s development as strongest economy gave 
powerful momentum to political development. EU’s ambition to become political actor 
gave a strong impetus to member states political unity, its increased political influence 
required credible military instrument which became ESDP project.  
The fifth driver became defence industry, during decades after WWII in Europe and in 
US defence industry has grown up significantly. Traditionally defence industry was 
subsidised by national governments. After Cold War defence sectors in Europe started 
to restructure and rationalise resulting into massive privatisation. Thousands of defence 
companies struggled to secure stable contracts without state support and compete with 
15 
 
US rivals on market. The optimal choice seemed to be the creation of the well-managed 
system which could balance demand and procurement avoiding closing of companies 
and increase of unemployment. As an example, we see that European Defence Agency 
(EDA) was amongst first institutions emerged within CSDP framework.  
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CHAPTER 2  
2.1 Theoretical framework  
The neoclassical realism is the general theoretical framework of the dissertation which 
would offer a wide array of instruments. Neoclassical realism has been elaborated at the 
end of 20 century by Gideon Rose, it combines structural realism's stringent account of 
the structure and classical realism's broad understanding of agency (Running, 2011). 
The theory delights central place to the concept of relative power- the capabilities and 
resources with which states can influence each other as the independent variable (Rose, 
1998). Neoclassical realism argues that relative material power establishes the basic 
parameters of country's foreign policy. The theory brings two independent variables: 
first, the domestic politics where political elites or actual political leaders perceptions on 
relative power defines foreign policy. Second, the strength of a country (Rose,1998)- 
which is based on the level of delegated authority or trust by society to the state 
apparatus for using national resources for foreign policy ends. By other words, the 
relative power dynamics drive policy but the people and institutions actually make it. 
From this perspective, CSDP is driven by power dynamics the rise of Europe for 
different reasons and conditions- but shaped by European people responding to their 
own desires and needs(Running 2011).  
In order to better organise unit level variables pursued by G.Rose in his theory, I will 
use a wide scope of Domestic Settings conceptualised by J. Duffield. Duffield explains 
that domestic settings are a combination of firstly National capacity which determines 
the ability of the state to pursue different courses of action and secondly national 
predisposition which defines necessity, effectiveness, and appropriateness thus 
desirability of some particular policy (Duffield.J, 1998). National capacity encompasses 
more material dimension of a nation such as population, economy, military capability. 
National predispositions encompass mostly political culture. Therefore having the 
opportunity to discuss agency on unit/state level and balance of power within the 
structure on an international level will considerably increase our scope and inventory for 
further research.  
Based on short historical overview further research will include three major European 
powers as Britain, France, Germany and their transatlantic partner and superpower the 
US. The presence of European states indicates that we will encounter to a wide range of 
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diversity, in addition, the presence of the US will unfold transatlantic theme where 
alongside diversity emerges balancing in relation to the US and to each other in wider 
context. According to neoclassical realism theory, ESDP initiation could be explained 
as a result of increased relative power of Europe (Economy+political unity)which 
acquired impulse and trajectory fur further development in foreign and security area. 
That fits G.Rose's idea of relative power as an independent variable which affected EU's 
foreign policy outcome. However, we consider here intervening variables as political 
elites perceptions on systemic incentives and state strength having authorisation from 
society to use national resources for foreign policy aims. 
The most important factors what European leaders had to consider and interpret into 
their decision were: at first, the shift of the US focus from Europe to Asia-Pacific. That 
shift implied an increase of Europeans share on own security while they were reducing 
significantly own defences to reduce expenses. The second factor was Balkan wars 
which were gaining its momentum in the dangerously close proximity of European 
capitals causing a mass influx of refugees. This crisis became a serious challenge for 
Europeans for the reason US refused to get involved in conflict causing NATO to keep 
away as well at the initial stage till 1995. While it became obvious that Europeans were 
not able to deal themselves with the crisis the US and NATO became involved 
sidelining bumbling Europeans causing their dissatisfaction. That explains why the 
British, French and German leaders came out with a particular interpretation of systemic 
pressures which pushed to align to launch ESDP as a project which would offer the 
instrument for security while US and NATO were not interested in engaging. 
This case brings forward another issue of European countries. As a result of historical 
developments, European countries are very diverse in many aspects and different in 
their domestic and foreign/international policy, strategy aims and in the alliance as well. 
Systemic pressure induced  Britain, France and German to align to launch ESDP while 
without incentives doubtfully they would come out with this decision. European 
diversity concluded into power dynamics on the state level is not the only factor to 
consider in the research but also structural balance on the international level. While 
mentioning about balance within structure I eschew with its K.Waltz’s typical 
understanding which instrumentalizes hard balance of power or threat within structural 
realism as a tool for survival and matter to grapple with a superpower. Traditional 
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structural realism in relation to CSDP derives by variating three possible outcomes as 
Barry Posen described17 and Sten Rynning criticised18  CSDP as a balancer of the US 
power, CSDP as the anchoring US in Europe and finally CSDP as an instrument to 
balance Germany. According to S.Running structural realism is separating material 
conditions with subjective factors describing motives behind CSDP in result deriving by 
ideas that it is either attempt to adopt to post-Cold War power dynamics or attempt to 
balance US power without recognising the futility of intentions. These explanations are 
missing the point what in fact Europeans and Americans want from CSDP because from 
wider picture factors of agency is excluded (Running,2011,p.33).  
Since balancing appears within the structure as a systemic feature we will introduce soft 
balancing described by Rober Pape as a major tool. Pape conceptualised soft balancing 
as ”actions that do not directly challenge... military preponderance but that use 
nonmilitary tools to delay, frustrate, and undermine aggressively ... military policies. 
Soft balancing using international institutions, economic statecraft, and diplomatic 
arrangements19 ” 
Soft balancing will be useful to explain the US-UK transatlantic endeavour within 
Europe and Franco-German cooperation. As a result of historical developments the 
Britain is US’s strategic ally and bridge to Europe, France and Germany are 
Transatlantic allies to the US, however, their relationship is defined by different factors. 
France and Germany are strategic partners in Europe and primary drivers of EU 
integration process. The Georg W. Bush’s unilateral policy of preventive actions against 
rogue states worldwide and particularly int the MiddleEast caused negative effects for 
its European allies (Pape,2005). Moreover, it caused the rise of concerns among global 
powers such as Russia and China instigating hard/soft balancing against it. In addition 
to those factors, US unilateral actions undermined UN’s credibility and created 
dangerous precedents which the Russia used to unfold its revisionist approach in result 
occupying Georgian, Ukrainian territories and acquiring a major position in Syria. 
Mentioned developments triggered Europe’s decision to start soft balancing against the 
                                                          
17 Posen.B, 2006, European Union Security and Defense Policy: Response to Unipolarity?, Security 
Studies, pp 149-186. 
18 Rynning.S, 2011, Realism and the Common Security and Defence Policy, JCMS pp 23-42 
 
19 Pape.R, 2005, Soft Balancing Against United States, International Security, pp 7-45 
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US unilateral aggressive policy based on Franco-German power core. Such state of 
affears raised dilemma for the Britain either align with France and Germany and 
facilitate degradation of the US domination in Europe or stay with the US and using 
same soft balance strategy to prevent developing European power core. R. Pape's soft 
balance theory will be a useful tool to apply to described context and explain Europe 
transatlantic interplay. 
Above discussed factors triggers us to explore strategic differences between leading 
European states which affect their policies in relation to EU in general and in relation to 
foreign and security policy particularly.  
2.2 Research Problem, Question and Tasks 
Above discussed historical development, drivers or geostrategic factors emerged as a 
result of the natural development of state of affairs, however, impediments were a result 
of human intention and state reasons to serve own interests. 
The dissertation will define research problem as–Why has the CSDP failed to develop 
and expand deeper?   
The CSDP has relevance as an object of common interests of member states within the 
framework of the EU since its early stage of institutional development, however, 
security and defence issues are organic parts of a sovereign state.   
Conducted revision of Europe’s leading states some of the major factors shaping their 
positions towards European security we identify the primary research question: 
Why do the UK, France and Germany have such widely different views on the CSDP? 
The aim of this research is to explore the range of causative factors that prevent the EU 
from developing a united and coherent approach towards effective defence capabilities. 
The tasks of research are: 
1)      To identify major strategic divergences of EU states such as the UK, France, and 
Germany 
2)      To identify and describe key factors that have contributed to these strategic 
divergences. 
2.3 Research Methodology                                                                                           
The dissertation is an effect orientated case study, seeking to explicate and explain all 
factors which having marginalising effect on CSDP, by the purpose to address research 
tasks stated we have chosen to conduct a case study with process tracing. Based on our 
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intention have been identified three countries the United Kingdom, France and Germany 
to be studied and identify how they contributed to EU CSDP development process. 
Those countries have been chosen for a reason since they are similar in many respects 
and they are considered as being in the forefront of European affairs since the end of 
WWII. As we already studied from historical overview the UK, France and Germany 
laid the ground for the ESDP later CSDP development but varied in their attitudes and 
strategy for time to come. The UK, France and Germany are European democratic 
societies, they are relatively large countries possessing similar economic power and 
population. Existing differences of aspirations in global or regional context, the 
structure of bilateral relationships with other partners and involvement into the global 
milieu in different geographical locations providing us with enough evidence to conduct 
the case study. We will trace process since 1998 when the first time has been launched 
process until recent time. For this reason, we will examine official documents and 
respective leaders speeches reflecting state's foreign and security policy to identify their 
role in global dynamics and particularly their position in regards to European security 
considering factors and conditions contributing to their attitudes. The research will be 
divided into three phase: I phase will analyse documents; II phase will make synthesis 
and III phase will draw to the conclusion. 
2.4 Variables 
To elaborate above-stated research question within academic methodological research 
framework I pursue in this thesis set of variables: 
Dependent Variable (DV)–EU’s leading countries strategies towards the deeper 
development of CSDP  
The strategy towards deeper CSDP could be elaborated as deliberate exploitation of 
existing national ideational, or material means in a particular way explicated into 
attitudes and actions of state to achieve desirable outcome towards or within EU’s 
CSDP resulting into its comprehensive development as common European defence20, 
regression or maintaining status unchanged. The CSDP is the common military-civilian 
dimension of the EU providing general framework of EU's defence policy. It outlines 
principles of generation of common civilian or military capabilities, defines tasks, areas 
and cases of operational engagement and responsibilities in relation to common 
                                                          
20 42(3) Treaty of European Union, Consolidated version. 
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security. CSDP as an institutional part of EU describes structure and rules of the 
decision-making process, due to its nature CSDP is primarily subjected to member 
states decisions. CSDP includes the framework of cooperation with NATO their 
interrelation allows the share of operational capabilities.  
At first, we have to create clear picture how EU leading member states has an effect on 
CSDP, clarifying all aspects of states and CSDP correlation outlining major factors 
which could be placed into different context provides an opportunity to proceed with the 
elaboration of independent variables. For operationalization of different variables will 
be outlined time period since 1998-until now. The reason is that December 3, 1998, 
Saint-Malo Franco-British declaration became marking the moment for European 
Security and Defence Policy. The process previously propelled by Franco-German 
cooperation then picked-up by Britain in late 1998 caused interests of other EU member 
states launching integration process in defence area which is ongoing at present. The 
UK, France and Germany will be taken as model countries for analysis.  
Operationalization of dependent variable will be conducted in two directions to 
illustrate the ideational and material commitment of states:  
The first direction will illustrate states strategy towards CSDP, thus should be analysed 
defence white papers explicating states strategic vector in foreign, security and defence 
policies in general and particularly in regards to European Security and Defence Policy. 
States strategies could be graded according to their level of support low, medium or 
high coupled with the timetable. This table will illustrate fluctuation of national 
strategies over the time period.    
Another aspect to be measured is the level of states material commitment into CSDP. 
This aspect could be measured by comparing the ratio of states Gross National Income 
(GNI) and its financial contribution to the CSDP operations. Data is based on Athena 
Mechanism established by Council of Europe December 2011. Athena is establishing 
principles of financing common costs of operations having military or defence 
implications which cannot be financed from EU budget. Also, will be reviewed states 
participation and personnel contribution into CSDP civilian and military operations.  
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Independent Variable 1-Level of global role aspirations  
Countries presented within the study are regional leaders, characterised by global 
aspirations on various degrees. Their development throughout history was linked with 
power expansion, conquering and acquiring new territories for resources acquisition, 
increase of influence and establishing control on important trade routes within the 
continent and overseas. Turbulent legacies of modern nation-state formation have its 
implications even today, their high degree of aspirations in foreign, security policy and 
trade requires constant/consistent presence and participation or initiation in shaping 
various milieus providing international political influence which is materialised into 
different political or economical benefits.  Global aspiration requires states political 
determination based on national predisposition with its political culture, capability and 
agility to influence the situation in different geographical locations effectively through 
civil or military means. The possession of assets and freedom of action is the decisive 
aspect for regional or global leadership. Countries with high aspirations are less eager to 
submit their sovereignty to alliance where supranational foundation prevails on national. 
Close scrutiny of states global aspiration in various fields and geographical areas which 
require political and power capabilities would serve to explain their level or reasons of 
commitments in states union’s CSDP.  
Hypothesis1(H1). Countries with high global aspirations will be less likely to increase 
their commitment to supranational institutions which limits their freedom of action in 
foreign and security dimension.  
We assume that as higher is the level of global role aspirations as more capabilities it 
should generate and ensure its sovereign rights to engage in various interactions in the 
global context are not limited by the supranational organisation. Measuring global role 
aspirations level has its purpose, at first, it will illustrate which of model countries has 
higher aspiration level and actually engaged in global affairs in various geographical 
locations for different reasons. The object of interaction, intensity, coherence, character 
and result of engagement will be differentiated on low, medium, the high scale which 
will be connected to timetable with similar time range 1998-till now. The aspiration 
scale coupled with timetable will illustrate countries raise or decrease of global role 
aspiration. The inferences derived from empirical data analysis will prove or disprove 
our hypothesis. 
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Independent variable 2- The level of integration into the European Union 
Membership and level of integration in the EU outline member states level of 
institutional integration into policy areas competencies, its level of readiness to 
undertake, transfer and apply domestically responsibilities and policies defined by the 
union in various fields including security and defence. 
The defining variation of integration level will illustrate the correlation between support 
of deeper CSDP development and other variables such as level of global role aspiration 
within conditions framed by transatlantic relationship. Based on our observations we 
can draw inferences that support or falsifies our hypothesis. 
H2 the higher the level of a member state’s integration into EU the higher will its 
support for deeper CSDP development. 
For measuring independent variable should be defined level of countries acceptance and 
adherence to major agreements or regulatory frameworks of states union, for this 
purpose should be analysed states parliaments' ratification of those fundamental 
agreements with the European Union, should be defined the level of engagement in EU 
policies developments in different areas.  
Independent variable 3 - the level of transatlantic cooperation 
The transatlantic cooperation is the overarching format of the interaction of European 
states with theUS and NATO. The nature of cooperation within this framework is 
defined by the fact that the US is the world superpower, moreover, it is initiator and 
major contributor of NATO which is Europe's primary security instrument capable of 
dealing with wide range of tasks including military and political component. The US 
possessing strongest influence on the world based on its determination, military and 
economic power being driver of most processes over the world. Membership of NATO 
as the multilateral framework of institutionalised political and military cooperation 
provides security guarantees. Close transatlantic relations for European states facilitates 
to promote their influence or acquiring beneficial positions in the world’s political and 
economical processes. Importantly superpower’s interests are involved in the Europe 
including security, defence and trade, therefore it seeks to extend its influence over the 
EU, and NATO beyond its primary role is one instrument of it.  As already mentioned 
close transatlantic cooperation between the US and European state is beneficial for both 
sides one having the privileged relationship with the US can acquire the advanced 
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position in world's political arena increasing their influence and reach in turn supporting 
US interests in EU as example US-UK special relations. 
H3.As far the Transatlantic framework provides for EU states security guarantees and 
possibility to benefit from the privileged relationship with the US less will be their 
support to deeper CSDP development. 
The examination of the transatlantic framework engagement level variation will provide 
us understanding about as an exogenous factor affecting the UK's, France's and 
Germany's position in regards of CSDP.  
The variable could be examined trough the study of bilateral and multilateral 
cooperation agreements in security, defence and trade sphere.  
Based on conceptualization and operationalization of variables we developed the 
structure of their interdependence. 
The variation of the France, Germany’s and the UK’s, global role aspirations same as 
their level of support of EU integration and their relations within transatlantic 
framework has the direct effect on their commitment level into deeper CSDP 
development. 
IV-1 has direct effect to DV, by variation of state's global role aspiration subsequently 
will change the level of commitment to the deeper CSDP, for example, UK's high level 
of global aspirations affecting its decision to commit itself to the deeper development of 
CSDP which will constrain its sovereignty. 
IV-2 has a direct impact on DV by variation of its EU integration level will change its 
level of support of deeper CSDP, for example, Germany, it perceives its role as a 
regional leader supporting closer and deeper integration of EU subsequently supporting 
deeper CSDP development. 
IV-3 has a direct impact on DV by variation of the level of transatlantic cooperation will 
change states level of support to CSDP deeper development. 
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2.5 Methodology for official documents analysis 
To address our problem statement and to comply with the methodological framework 
we intend to examine the validity of hypothesis trough analysing six documents having 
different spatial and temporal origin representing states foreign, security and defence 
policy. The analysis will be conducted in order to define states strategies towards EU's 
defence matters, their attitude towards EU's integration, their global role aspiration, and 
their scope of cooperation with the USA and NATO. The results will be compared to 
each other to acknowledge motivation and factors underpinning states action. 
Analysis will be conducted in two stages: during first stage will be analysed three 
documents dating 1994 to 1998 in relation to historical event Saint-Malo Franco-British 
Declaration (4 December 1998) those are: the UK Strategic Defence Review 1998, 
French Strategic Defence Reform Program of President J. Chirac 1996, and White 
Paper on the Security of the Republic of Germany and the Situation and Future of the 
Bundeswehr 1994. The reason for choosing this particular historical event is that 
declaration signed by British Prime Minister Tony Blair and French President Jacques 
Chirac in 1998 became the deriving point for CSDP intensive developments for next 
several years. 
During Second stage will be analysed three most recent documents in relation to current 
political developments. The second group of documents are The UK National Security 
Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015, French White Paper Defence 
and National Security 2013 and Germany’s White Paper on German Security Policy and 
the Future of the Bundeswehr 2016.  
Those documents are equal carrying the same function in respective states as an outline 
for states strategies for foreign security and defence policies. To analyse selected 
documents will be used narrative analysis method. This method allows us to maintain a 
wide spectrum of interested for us issues nonetheless giving the possibility to examine 
them deeper.  
The comparison of results of documents analysis relevant to two temporal periods will 
provide us ground to prove or disprove our hypothesis and later contribute to the 
conclusion. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Narrative Analysis  
3.1 Strategic Defence Review 1998  
Strategic defence Review (SDR) 1998 is official document submitted by Secretary of 
Defence Georg Robertson.  The document based on its assessment of new post-Cold 
War era is guidance to remodel British defence policy and Armed Forces in the 
response to changing world. SDR is based on foreign policy, therefore the primary 
orientation of the UK's defence responding to the factors emerging from changing 
world. SDR was a declaration of foreign and security policy of newly elected (May 
1997) Labour party government of Tony Blair. Submitting SDR was the great 
possibility to capitalise on the initiatives and failures of previous conservative 
government (1979-1997). Their motto of "New Labour" was affecting their initiations in 
foreign policy and defence same as in the areas as education, health and social 
welfare.21 In 1998 the UK absorbed presidency of EU Council great chance for Blair to 
show his effectiveness to the international audience and regain Britain’s position in 
forefront of European affairs.  
The UK’s global role aspiration expressed within SDR 1998                                  
The SDR represents an open declaration of the UK to take increased responsibility as 
the great power on the world stage. The narrative is constructed trough articulation of 
different argumentations derived from a reassessment of changing the strategic 
environment. Should be mentioned important factor as national predisposition which 
allowed empowering ideas supporting the UK’s global ambitions expressed in SDR. 
Britain’s greatness and exceptionalism were equally supported by all political parties, 
therefore actions taken to reform the Armed Forces trading capacity for capabilities and 
undertake expensive nuclear deterrence reform acquired popular support. According to 
SDR to advance Britain’s global position was the reason for its economy structure 
including dependence on export, imported raw materials and investments. British trade 
spread out beyond Europe was not confined to EU or US demanding continuous 
interaction with its foreign partners worldwide. British exports proportion in GDP is 
                                                          
21 Blair, T. 2010,  A Journey. 
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higher than those of US, Japan Germany or France. Britain is investing more of its 
income in the developing world than France, Germany and Italy together (SDR 1998), 
presumably to exploit opportunities of the cheaper labour force and lower production 
expenses. Foreign direct investment into Britain provides nearly 20% of manufacturing 
works (19) which could be important to support employment rate of middle/ lower class 
electorate to maintain their support. SDR admits Britain’s dependence on supplies of 
raw materials above all oil making argument for its engagement into Gulf region.  For 
this reason, Britain has the well established network of military outposts to secure its 
transportation routes stretching from Mediterranean including Gibraltar and Cyprus 
(Akrotiri and Dekalia sovereign base areas) trough red sea Strait of Aden, United Arab 
Emirates (Al Minhad air base) giving access to Gulf region and then further to South 
Asia. Amongst arguments supporting UK’s global aspirations is the fact that Britain 
posess13 overseas territories most of those territories have an important strategic 
location, hosting British or US military bases.  Several million British citizens are living 
abroad, some of them on military duty, by the beginning of 1998, Britain had 25.000 
troops deployed in Northern Ireland and elsewhere.  Britain’s structure of international 
relations and membership of different regional or global political and international 
organisations requires UK’s participation and upholding its responsibility (20). In the 
following paragraph, SDR discuss security outside of Europe,  protracted conflicts in 
the Middle East making an accent on explosive situation in Iraq.  This line of reasoning 
pursued in SDR explains why Britain should uphold its global role avoid restraining 
itself with European affairs.  
The UK’s engagement into EU integration process expressed in SDR 1998          
The SDR does not dedicate an important place to EU, within document there is only one 
sentence mentioning EU as an institution which has a role to preserve and extend 
economic prosperity and political stability trough the CFSP(39). The UK's ambitions to 
participate in EU's integration process was always insubstantial, Britain's interest in 
European affairs is outlined according to two interests points such as European security 
and defence industry acquiring favourable condition on European armaments market. 
Wars in Balkans had the deteriorating effect on wider European security, threatening by 
spill-over of violence and influx of large masses of refugees. SDR emphasises the 
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indispensable role of NATO as security instrument and then in this context discuss the 
role of WEU and European Defence Identity (EDI) but it newer discusses EU as a 
framework for European security.  This situation is quite odd because after four-month 
British government radically changed its position and joined Germany to promote the 
idea about absorbing WEU within EU’s structure.  
Britain's ambitions to launch extensive rearmament required close cooperation with 
other European states. SDR emphasises the importance of British defence industry 
providing jobs for over 400,000 people and earning the country around £5Bn from 
exports each year (162). The British government was committed to maintaining strong 
defence industry considering reduction of Western European armies has significantly 
affected industry sector (164). The pressure on defence industry in the US already 
pushed to rationalise production and implemented aggressive marketing to dominate in 
European and other markets. Defence industry became a catalyst to engage in initiatives 
to establish a common and favourable framework within EU22. SDR outlined that 
European governments should harmonise the requirements their Armed Forces and find 
cooperative solutions. By that, they would avoid unnecessary duplication of production 
costs, research and development. For this purpose government addressed issues of 
intellectual property rights which would hinder restructuring and sign Letter of Intent 
defining the tentative schedule.  
The UK-Transatlantic cooperation within SDR 1998                                               
The transatlantic framework was always a priority, US-UK interdependence in military 
and trade dominated its foreign policy. SDR emphasises the importance of European 
cooperation with North America within NATO context as "uniquely effective political 
and military alliance”(39). The SDR explicates most important moments which are 
indirectly related to the UK-US bilateral cooperation. At first, while the UK is 
discussing optimisation of nuclear arsenal by downsizing existing and introducing the 
US made Trident missiles. This decision was pragmatic and implied maintaining US- 
British special relations intact in the agenda of new Labor government. At second, its 
support to pressure Saddam Hussein's regime to comply with UN resolutions.The UK-
NATO cooperation is emphasised as a primary instrument to maintain peace and 
                                                          
22 Projects included Euro fighter Tornado, large capacity strategic airlift planes A400M Airbus and many 
other. 
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stability, its unique nature allows to bring its closest ally the US into play of European 
security and defence and achieve a favourable balance of power acquiring major role for 
already 50 years. SDR praises NATO for its engagement in Bosnia and Kosovo 
operations and supports NATO initiatives of enlargement to East and to create 
Partnership for Peace (PfP) mechanism. 
The dominant idea within SDR is the formation of Joint forces23 which would facilitate 
its global ambitions "For conflict prevention, peace support, crisis management and 
war ...This applies to NATO commitments, operations under the auspices of the UN or 
other international organisations,” 24  
These extensive changes were the result of experiences of first Gulf and Balkan wars 
additionally considering UK’s national interest to hold the strong grip on oil-rich Gulf 
region and safeguarding transportation routes.  
The UK’s strategy towards ESDP defined in SDR 1998                                                
For defence and security, WEU is to be more frontline „The Western European Union 
has an important role in fostering defence co-operation amongst its members, in 
conflict prevention and, particularly, peacekeeping. Development of the European 
Security and Defence Identity within NATO will enable the Western European Union to 
carry out these roles more effectively.” (39). This statement is important because SDR 
was submitted and presented in May 1998, however, the UK radically changed its 
attitude until November of the same year, Tony Blair and Goerge Robertson pursued an 
utterly different policy in regards of WEU, EU and its defence. That provides 
argumentation that Britain's leadership's shift in favour to ESDP Sept/Oct 1998 was due 
to interpreting systemic pressures existed before or raised after submission of SDR 
according to neoclassical theory. 
3.2 National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence Review 2015                    
National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence Review 2015 (NSS SDR2015) also 
called as A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom is document submitted by David 
                                                          
23 Joint Rapid Reaction Forces, Joint RN/RAF fixed wing Force (Joint Force 2000), Joint Battlefield 
Helicopter Command, Joint Army/RAF Ground Based Air Defence organisation, Deployable Joint Force 
Headquarters and greater powers for Chief of Joint Operations. Joint Defence Centre, New Strategic Lift 
assets 
24 Strategic Defence Review 1998, Joint Rapid Reaction Forces 91. P32 
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Cameron in 2015. This document is interesting in the context of discussing British 
government's views on security and defence before upcoming elections on BREXIT. 
The main focus of the document is Britain's economy as the ground for national 
security, other accents are made on the reconfiguration of Britain's Armed Forces, 
ensuring the effectiveness of security and intelligence agencies and instrumentalization 
of diplomatic service to promote Britain's interests and project its influence. 
The UK’s Global aspiration expressed in NSS SDR 2015 
Global influence projection in the document is national security objective two, Britain is 
utilising comprehensive approach to extend its own influence trough the diplomacy, 
supporting DFDI programs in the South Asia, the Middle East and Africa, the skilful 
instrumentalization of defence Engagement and promoting its attractiveness trough the 
soft power application using British Council and BBC as assets.  
According to document, Britain's global aspiration strategy includes close interlink with 
allies who share its geostrategic interests and values such as NATO countries including 
US and Canada, European countries, and Australia, New Zealand and Japan. Britain is 
going to maintain UN’s 0,7% GNI spending on development and strengthen security 
and prosperity partnership in Gulf, Africa and Asia Pacific. Britain is looking for the 
partnership with growing powers, to be able to promote and protect own interests in the 
future. 
The UK’s support to EU Integration NSS SDR 2015 
In the context of BREXIT assessing Britain's government's attitudes towards EU during 
Prime Minister Cameron's government is particularly interesting. NSS SDR has been 
submitted on November 21 of 2015 while Anti-EU sentiments were already strong in 
Britain, at this time negotiations on the better deal for the UK has been ongoing. The 
interesting point is that subchapter European Union is outlined in a positive manner 
bringing forward benefits of coexistence and cooperation.  Subchapter states that 
European security and prosperity is essential for Britain's security and prosperity. It 
supports dynamic, competitive and outwardly focused Europe. NSS SDR discusses EU 
as an important complementary instrument to NATO possessing political and economic 
instruments as sanctions or assistance programs effectively utilised in case of Russia's 
aggression against Ukraine. Document in positive context describes achievements of 
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CSDP format listing military or civilian operations worldwide (5.41). The document 
emphasises its interests in facilitating close cooperation between EU-NATO in areas 
such as cyber and countering hybrid threats working in the capacity building in other 
states (5.42). The document emphasises EU's importance as credible trade partner 
bringing statistical data (5.43). The document also mentions negotiations between UK 
and EU for better condition and surprisingly mentions that at the end of 2017 will be 
held the referendum on membership in EU which in fact has been held in June 2016. 
The UK-Transatlantic relationship expressed in NSS SDR 2015                         
Within transatlantic framework the UK emphasises the importance of UK-US special 
relationship and explains its contribution to it, at first Britain's European and global 
reach and influence, intelligence, the strategic location of British overseas territories, 
military interoperability and UK's ability to undertake war-fighting independently or as 
a lead nation in a coalition (5.29). According document to maintain their relationship is 
pragmatic to be coupled with the strongest economy in the world (5.30). The document 
is voicing intent to strengthen the interoperability of two armed forces, including 
collaboration on different programs including US's intent to place its aircraft in the UK. 
Another point of junction for the US-UK transatlantic relationship is their central 
position in NATO and including their nuclear capabilities available for NATO’s 
deterrence. US-UK are closest partners to support security and stability in European 
neighbourhood, Middle East, Africa and Central Asia, (5.33). To fight against 
extremism, terrorism, corruption, climate change and promotes rule of law by enhancing 
cooperation with fragile states and regions building joint DFID-USAID programmes. 
UK emphasises its commitment to spend 2% GDP spending on defence to meet 
NATO’s priority requirements, The UK is planning in 2017 to lead Very High 
Readiness Joint Task Force which was formed in response to Russia's aggression in 
Ukraine. The UK is also planning to provide its Typhoons for Baltic Air Policing 
Mission, its ships and Army units participated in joint-combined training in Baltic to 
reassure its NATO partners. Britain is also planning to join German-US Trans-Atlantic 
Capability Enhancement and Training (TACET) initiative in the Baltic states and 
Poland. 
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The UK’s strategy towards CSDP expressed in NSS SDR 2015                            
Since 1998 Saint-Malo Franco-British declaration changed many things including 
Britain's attitude towards EU in general including CSDP. Within SDR Britain does not 
discuss CSDP as such, it is mentioned couple times in general terms. As a result of 
analysis, we learned that Britain prefers to extend its bilateral cooperation framework in 
the area of security and defence rather than to use the multilateral framework such as 
CSDP.  The document emphasises Franco-British defence and security cooperation 
based on Lancaster House Treaty 2010. Since Saint-Malo this treaty between UK and 
France became most important, it encompasses the full range of cooperation areas 
starting from forces interoperability to nuclear cooperation and defence industry.  
3.3 Defence Strategic Reform 1996, France 
The Document acquired for analysis represents supporting speech delivered by 
President Jacques Chirac in Military school, Paris February 23, 1996. This speech 
represents Defence Strategic Reform of President Chirac that became broad reform 
program for reform. The document is obtained from President of France official 
website.25 The preceding document “1994 Livre Blanc Sur la Defense" Defence White 
Paper has been developed during the presidency of  Francois Mitterrand and submitted 
by prime Minister Edouard Balladur, however, this document has never triggered 
important reforms.  
In 1995 the presidential elections won former prime minister (1974-76, 1986-88) and 
Mayor of Paris Jacques Chirac, the established political stalemate was an opportunity to 
offer own reforms and gain political support domestically and internationally. 
The speech delivered in military school was a starting point for defence strategic 
reform. 
France’s global role aspiration expressed in Strategic Defence Program 1996 
Frances global ambition is the main idea pursued within speech, mentioned areas of 
points reform were contributing to Frances international stance and domestic political 
discourse. Chirac mentions that collapse of Soviet Union established fertile ground for 
                                                          
25 http://www.jacqueschirac-asso.fr/archives-
elysee.fr/elysee/elysee.fr/francais/interventions/discours_et_declarations/1996/fevrier/allocution
_aux_armees_prononcee_par_le_president_de_la_republique_a_l_ecole_militaire.192.html 
In the archives, until 2002 English versions are not available, therefore, the quality of translated script 
from French to English by Google is very poor. 
 
33 
 
European integration which is enrooted in profound solidarity. Chirac states that peace 
remains fragile and brings into play UN as the main actor to state the international law, 
prevent and contain crisis and conflicts. France as a permanent member of Security 
Council takes an active part and ensures that UN has the necessary means to accomplish 
its mission. Chirac is meaning French forces which are playing the vital role in Bosnia 
and elsewhere “Our country, as a permanent member of the Security Council, takes an 
active part and to ensure that the UN has the means necessary to accomplish its 
mission” (18). In this context promotion of the idea of projectable forces seems timely 
and logical. By mentioning the role of French troops in first Gulf War and in Bosnia 
indicates its desire to participate in the global affairs. In addition to its Security Council 
obligation projectable force idea serves for extending its foreign and security policy out 
of French metropolis of course including its foreign territories(77).  
Another important aspect where its global ambitions can be seen is nuclear deterrence 
reform. President Chirac declared outlined the scope of reform which included: 
Strategic Oceanic Force should have had four ballistic missile submarines two of them 
on patrol while other two in docs. 
Chirac proposed closing the ground-based nuclear base Albion Plateau which became 
unnecessary and expensive. A new ballistic missile M51 was ready to change old M45.  
He proposed to abolish HADES which was designed to participate during Cold War in 
deterrent manoeuvre as theatre ballistic missile. Nuclear deterrence reform was 
indicating that in new era France was stepping in with modernised capabilities and 
ready to uphold its global position. 
France’s support to EU integration process expressed in Strategic Defence 
Reform 1996                                                                                                         
France together with Germany was an active supporter of EU integration process, 
many policies as Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) or ESDP has been developed 
either by the initiative of France or with its active participation. EMU and Schengen 
zone agreement was important policies in the scope of integration dragged through 
by Franco-German cooperation. By that time Franco-German cooperation already 
included in agenda European Union defence matters, Chirac admits that this reform 
should give a strong impulse to their relation and incorporate the UK as well as an 
important partner. He expects that France and Germany will remain as the engine of 
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European defence (37). Frances commitment into EU integration is traced through its 
undertakings in the defence industry and market regulation as well (89). Above 
mentioned reform was not possible without a profound restructuring of the defence 
industry. Chirac announces the creation of two major industrial centres in electronics 
and aerospace which should be competitive to better engage in international 
competition.26 He supports reform in armament acquisition and triggering 
competitiveness amongst domestic and foreign companies.  
France-Transatlantic cooperation expressed in Strategic Defence Reform 1996 
Frances cooperation with the US is not aggregated within speech. However, it goes 
as the background within part of speech discussing nuclear deterrence capabilities. 
At the end of 1980’s has been disclosed fact about Franco-American cooperation 
over nuclear deterrence capabilities since 1969. In early 1990's during the presidency 
of Mitterrand France took responsibility to stop nuclear tests and close its test site, 
however, before terminating program he renewed nuclear tests in order to get 
processable data to perfect computer software for future laboratory simulations 
(Running.S).  In June of 1996, France signed the cooperation memorandum with the 
US about the exchange of nuclear test data and later same year September 24 it 
signed Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Within speech, NATO is 
voiced only once in the context of solidarity stating France's bounds to its NATO 
Allies, EU partners and Africa (34). Nonetheless, should be mentioned that defence 
reforms include many activities which imply close cooperation with NATO military 
structure that played a role in France-NATO rapprochement. The next important 
moment in the text is a demand of President Chirac that reformed Armed Forces 
must respond to French ambition to build credible European defence and combine 
the dual role of the military arm of the EU and the European pillar of the Atlantic 
Alliance (35).  
France’s strategy towards ESDP defined in Strategic Defence Reform 1996 
President Chirac voices his position towards European defence which is definitely 
supportive. He brings defence reform to offer French forces as defence arm of Europe. 
Projectable force idea also comes as a solution for European security related problems 
                                                          
26 EADS and Thompson CSF were on the list of top 10 global defence industry companies. Global 
security. 
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considering Balkans. By that time France already actively was involved in developing 
the idea of EU defence, it was closely cooperating with Germany in regards to 
integration process including security and defence amongst other areas of EU 
integration. France together with its closest European partner Germany already created 
Brigade contributing into Euro corps.  
3.4 French Defence White Paper 2013 
French White Paper on Defence and National Security 2013 is most recent guiding 
document after 2008. Document submitted by François Holland represents views and 
intentions of the recent French government. The document includes 7 chapters 
discussing French position in the new strategic landscape, foundations of the strategy 
for defence and national security, the state of the world, Frances engagement in the 
Atlantic alliance and in the EU, the way to implement the strategy and the resources 
required. The French national defence and security strategy discussed in White Paper 
are based on two fundamental aspects as France's sovereignty and s its will to contribute 
to the international security. 
France’s global role aspirations expressed in White Paper 2013 
In White paper, France focuses on Africa from Guinea to Somalia including Sahel 
Arabian Maghreb, the Mediterranean to the Horn of Africa and Gulf of Aden. 
France is taking an active stance in Arabian Peninsula and Gulf region. It developed 
defence cooperation with three states in the region as Qatar, Kuwait, and United Arab 
Emirates, France has established a joint military base in Abu-Dhabi, signed the military 
cooperation agreement with Bahrain and has the close relationship with Saudi Arabia. 
France intends to maintain grip in South Asia since trade relations are the priority for 
France and Europe. France is a part of Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South-East 
Asia. It supports the role of EU in the ASEAN regional forum (ARF). France has a 
close relationship with South Korea and Japan, moreover, France supports the security 
of several countries in the region as Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam. In 
addition to description of Frances engagement with different regional players France 
has its own overseas territories spread from Atlantic to Pacific and from Antarctic to 
Arctic 27 some of those territories are regional hubs attracting near located powers to 
                                                          
27 The Antilles-French Guinea, New Caledonia, French Polynesia, Wallis et Futuna, Reunion Island, 
Mayotte, The Iles Eparses, French Southern and Antarctic Lands (TAAF), The Archipelago of Saint-
Pierre-et-Miquelon. 
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interact and develop different agenda for cooperation. Some of them are oil rich, 
possess abound fishery resources or have a strategic location for trade or transportation 
allowing France to engage with different regional leaders and organisations in 
cooperation. Its overseas territories are amongst factors which triggered active 
participation of France in global politics.   
Frances attitude to EU integration expressed in White Paper 2013 
In the recent document, we observe that France's relation to EU integration process goes 
in line of supporting building its defence and security nature and EU's collaborative and 
coherent response to challenges. France considers the development of European 
approach to defence and security is a priority, it believes that magnitude of united 
European response would have much greater effect than solely taken national responses.  
France expects that knowledge and experiences of its own and other member states 
gained in crises would be appreciated and shared for the greater benefit of Europe, 
moreover, France expects from European External Action Service together with EU 
Defence Agency to play a stronger role in crisis management. France is ready to act to 
ensure the development of strategic vision in the European framework grounded on the 
analysis of shared risks and threats affecting internal security or CSDP. It intends to 
enable discussions between national parliaments and within EU to facilitate public 
understanding of strategic challenges. White Paper emphasises that “stabilisation of 
EU's neighbourhood represents a major element of security for all member countries”. 
France is suggesting “better coordination of civil and military resources and the union's 
procedures” which in turn must be adapted to its operational role. White Paper 
highlights common for EU states circumstances caused by 2008 crisis which inflicted 
restraints affecting defence spending and procurement projects28. Grounded on this fact 
France promotes pragmatic approaches and specific strategy to overcome established 
the situation, precede capabilities building and stimulate defence industry dynamics. 
One approach France is supporting is to engage in pooling and sharing capabilities. 
Another way is to start close cooperation within the framework of OCCAR (the 
organisation for joint armaments cooperation), which can offer additional levers for 
                                                                                                                                                                          
 
28 The French defence budget has been reduced from 1,7%to 1,5% excluding pensions. Some 34 000 
defence related jobs both civilian and military will be favourable until 2019.  Simon.l, Setting the Tone. 
The RUSI journal. 
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European countries to manage their armament acquisition and encourage European 
capability development, even attracting states with modest resources. The third point is 
“the development of the European defence market and consolidation of European 
Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB)”. France intends with European 
partners to promote the idea of establishing close coordination between NATO and 
EDA facilitating European defence industry development within NATO's smart defence 
and EU's pooling and sharing programs. Those initiations are perceived to be matter of 
soft balancing of US hegemonic power in Europe (Oswald.F,2006) 
France-Transatlantic cooperation expressed in White Paper on Defence 2013 
USA's role in European security as the indispensable partner is already well rooted. 
France has its own vision for US engagement into European security, it accepts the idea 
that European countries need to heed the US call for more burden sharing in military 
spending, but sharing will be more efficient if it will foster the development of the 
European defence industry. France supports the idea that stepping up for own and 
neighbourhood security will positively affect the relationship between Europe and USA. 
Increasing Europe's ability to respond to its own security challenges would probably 
ascend its global status. After 50 year divorce, France reintegrated into NATO's military 
structure and reclaimed its rightful place as one of the founding members in 2009. 
Within the transatlantic framework, White Paper rejects the idea that France will go 
alone only defending own vital interests disregarding any regional or global 
responsibilities. It also dismisses the idea that France would delegate its future to the 
USA and NATO although Alliance is the pillar for French defence policy. France 
upholds its position towards effective European defence strategy, however, taking in 
account existence of stumbling blocks.  Then follows priority for defence and national 
security strategy based on fundamental prerequisites: “the sovereignty of national 
decisions, complete engagement in a dynamic Atlantic Alliance, and proactive and 
ambitious position in regards of EU”.  France is keen to increase Alliance nuclear 
deterrence might by joining its nuclear capabilities contributing to the security of the 
Allies. France expects that NATO's developed military capacity to act within collective 
defence framework for the different type of conflicts should become the ground for 
crisis response operations against emerging threats and in collective security operations.  
Frances relation with NATO is influenced by the assigning Supreme Allied Command 
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Transformation (SACT) commanding position to French general trough that it can 
influence on overhauling of Alliances means for action. France is convinced that its 
sovereignty will not be affected and will have guarantees of the free decision in all 
circumstances nonetheless it is fully engaged in Alliance command. 
France does not draw the line between NATO and EU as rival organisations, it 
perceives them as complementary.  France pursues to facilitate close and pragmatic 
cooperation between two organisation in regards of NATO's Smart Defence and EU's 
Pooling and sharing programs to stimulate European defence industry.  It accentuates 
that US engagement into European security will be much stronger if Europe will 
increase its defence spending, however, may not happen unless defence spending fosters 
the development of the European defence industry. The defence industry has important 
place into its security agenda contributing every year 25%-40% to whole export 
including more than 4000 Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) generating annual 
revenue of 15 billion euro.  
France’s strategy towards CSDP expressed in White Paper 2013 
White Paper states that “current context makes a pragmatic revitalization of the CSDP 
possible and urgent". France is convinced that US military reorientation to the Asia-
Pacific region makes EU states to raise their responsibilities and engage in complex 
stabilisation operations to defuse instability pockets around Europe. According to these 
scenarios, European framework including CSDP will be central to mobilise civilian and 
military instruments. France considers that partnership between US and EU will be 
strengthened if EU will assume responsibility for its security. White Paper voices its 
position that impetus should come from highest political level such as European 
Council. EU Council should “initiate guidelines on three major topics: the mission of 
the CSDP, the capabilities to be developed in common and industrial strategies relating 
defence”. It also encourages to be issued EU “White Paper clearly defining the EU’s 
interests and strategic objectives and contribute to the wide debate on the security and 
defence”. This initiative coordinated at a higher level must acquire serious support to 
achieve real effects. France is keen to the EU's pragmatic approach to increasing forces 
operational capabilities of the forces deployed under CSDP. It is also convinced that it’s 
already time to start close coordination between member states for standardisation of 
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education, training and force generation. France is ready to contribute capabilities such 
as intelligence, surveillance, in-flight refuelling, and strategic transportation.    
3.5 German White Paper 1994                                                                             
German White Paper represents official document issued on 05 April 1994, submitted 
by Federal Chancellor Dr Helmut Kohl and Federal Minister of Defence Volker Rühe. 
The document is designed for domestic and foreign audience equally. The German 
defence white paper of 1994 is the successor of 1987 white paper and remained valid 
until 2006. this is a comprehensive document which includes seven chapters 
emphasising German unification process, world situation and Germany's position in it, 
the concept of Germany's security and defence policy,  German security policy and 
areas of its activity, Bundeswehr in the future, in a transitional period and its role in 
society. The context of the document is grounded on the number of important historical 
developments as the unification of Germany and withdrawal of Soviet/Russian forces, 
wars in Balkans, foundation and rise of European Union. 
Germany’s global role aspiration expressed in White Paper 1994                
Document described the fact of GDR-FRG unification and withdrawal of 
Soviet/Russian troops presumably provided strong psychological and economical 
impulse to German society resulting into ascending political position in wider Europe.  
Trough document it is visible that nation considering political aspects of its past 
preferring to pursue carefully balanced foreign policy, there is the notion that Germany 
is starting gently preparing the ground to assert its global role. Discussing Germany as 
emerging power of the 1990s and early 2000s we should consider limitations set by 
national predisposition shaping its foreign and security policy. German political culture 
and ideology expressed in 1949 and 1990 constitution prohibited the foreign use of 
military power and limited its functions within the country as well. Another aspect 
having influence is political fragmentation in Bundestag29 and nature of the democratic 
regime. Taking together those factors and combine to the ongoing formation of modern 
German identity would provide an answer why Germany did not pursue assertive 
foreign and security policy in the same manner as Britain or France to aspire global 
power role. However, would be wrong to say that Germany abandoned its Global 
                                                          
29 Election resources to the German Bundestag on the internet  http://www.electionresources.org/de/ 
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objectives at all, it just exploited different strategies which were less eye striking and 
more balanced. The evidence is visible in several moments found in the document. The 
first and most strong supportive argument is found in the text where Germany is 
announcing its readiness to assume the responsibility of a permanent member of UN 
Security Council (469)30.  Germany needed broad support, therefore, its security policy 
had to address global needs while avoid being too assertive and cause a repulsive effect.   
The centrality of this particular issue in German political establishment then and now 
indicates about rising ambitions of its global role.  The second moment is emphasised 
within the context of discussing regional developments. Germany is willing to absorb 
increased responsibility and to participate in shaping regional milieu as possessing 
central position within Europe.  White Paper analyses post-Soviet countries and 
importance of political process there, it focuses more on Russia and Ukraine by virtue 
of their size, location and their economic and military potential including nuclear 
capability, outlines their problems and emphasizes that “good Russo –German relations 
are important element for the future European system, of security and stability" (223).  
In regards of Ukraine White Paper considers the role of Ukraine in security and stability 
in Central Eastern Europe and beyond “The federal government considers a democratic, 
economically sound and independent Ukraine to be a factor of European 
stability"(224).  The document expresses the position in regards to nuclear arms control 
and it claims that Ukraine "must fulfil its arms control obligation" to eliminate all 
nuclear weapon systems and join Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon 
state according to the trilateral declaration issued by the USA, the Russian Federation 
and Ukraine on 14 January 1994. The third moment is visible while analysing 
Germany's views and attitudes in conjunction with the global problems and challenges. 
Germany calls to elaborate the concerted cohesive instrument to engage in crisis or 
conflict prevention “it may also be necessary to employ military means to prevent, 
confine or terminate violence or war” (256). This particular declaration is emphasising 
changing nature of Germany's foreign and security concept which had short lash before 
and starting to transform into more engaged and active player. The White Paper became 
                                                          
30 Germany is a third largest contributor after USA and Japan. It aspired to UN Security Council's 
permanent member seat in 2000 and 2004. Germany acquired Security Council's permanent members 
support, however, due to differences of the opinion of other European countries its application was 
declined. 
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starting moment to negotiate more complaint conditions to use military force outside of 
Germany mostly in Peacekeeping and crisis response operations. Bundestag allowed the 
use of military assets in principle in foreign operations, however, German participation 
and rules of engagement into operations remained the subject of discussion on a case by 
case.   
Germany's support to EU integration process expressed in White Paper 1994     
The end of Cold War induced the US to shift to the Asia-Pacific and middle East, thus 
European countries and particularly Germany could exert own influence. The EU in the 
early 1990s was a regional power with great economic potential and ambition to assert 
its political role on a global level. Germany decided to support EU’s influence 
expansion trough facilitating integration process thus increasing own influence as well 
as possessing economic and political strength (white paper 208). Germany's active 
participation was an important enabler to launch the European Monetary Union and the 
Schengen Area Agreement. Franco-German cooperation for CFSP development resulted 
in ESDP process initiation and development. Germany's activity aimed not only 
increasing EU's and own influence but contribute to common European security  
“Integration with the European democracies in the European union, for democracy, the 
rule of law and prosperity in Europe mean peace and security for Germany, too”(308). 
Germany-Transatlantic cooperation expressed in White Paper 1994                
Within White Paper there is no extensive discussion about Germany-US cooperation, 
Transatlantic and NATO framework of cooperation is the only context which makes 
explicit Germany's position in this regard. Transatlantic cooperation for Germany 
remains important to point, close relations with the United States represents common 
security assurance for Germany(410).  Another point is that Germany perceives  the US 
as a focal to maintain inner balance within European continent, its military presence in 
Europe viewed as important expression of solidarity (421) ”the lasting transatlantic 
alliance, based on a community of values and similar interests, with the United States 
as a world power, for the potential of the USA is indispensable for international 
stability”(308). Intensification of European integration by expanding EU with Common 
Foreign Security Policy encompassing WEU's revitalisation and ESDI capabilities 
development (318). Germany looks ways to clarify constitution to actively participate in 
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international peacekeeping operations on the basis of the UN charter or under auspices 
of the CSCE to be a dependable partner. In regards of NATO Germany based on the 
example of former Yugoslavia calls that besides the ability to mount a collective 
defence,  it should transform to be able to "support international conflict prevention and 
crisis management efforts and preserve peace”. Germany's such position was caused by 
a negative experience in Balkans while European states failed to steer crisis without US 
and NATO engagement.  
Germany’s strategy towards ESDP expressed in White Paper 1994            
Germany's position towards EU's defence initiatives is utterly supportive but not 
obsessive. It expresses its expectations that Maastricht Treaty 1993 which established a 
ground for the economic, monetary and social union would provide strong impetus 
progressive framing of common European defence. Germany's strategy is to enhance 
Europe's ability to take military action by expanding the WEU's operational role 
gradually incorporating it into EU’s structures and to help shape Europe's Security and 
Defence Identity within NATO framework. Germany welcomes assignment of 
Petersberg tasks as a new operational role to WEU it is convinced that WEU together 
with NATO becoming partners of UN and CSCE in international conflict prevention 
and crisis management.  Germany supports conditionality before undertaking 
operational actions by WEU it must be in compliance with UN charter. Also, a decision 
must be unanimous and member states have right to participate or opt out based on 
states constitution. Germany expects that WEU's gradual incorporation into EU will be 
an important step to framing Common Defence Policy leading to common defence 
(440).  White Paper emphasises Franco-German cooperation as driving force behind 
European unification. The Franco-German relationship has also military dimension 
including the joint brigade and Defence and Security Council, moreover, in the close 
future relationship will lay the foundation for a Common Security and Defence Policy 
in Europe (447). Amongst other aspects of Franco-German cooperation was mutual 
interests in armaments, research and development including about hundred common 
projects(451).  
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3.6  White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr 
2016 
The German Defence White Paper is a most recent official document issued in 2016 
submitted by Federal Minister of Defence Dr Ursula von der Leyen. The document is 
discussing key elements of German Security Policy, its security environment, strategic 
priorities key areas of engagement in German security policy, the Bundeswehr of the 
future its tasks, missions, capabilities and adaptation for the future. 
Germany’s global role aspiration expressed in White Paper 2016 
Germany’s global player role is emphasised through the accepting the task to care about 
"peace" as it is enshrined in the constitution. Germany after the decade of silence once 
again voiced its intention to become UN’s effective instrument “Germany remains 
willing to assume greater responsibility as a permanent member of a reformed Security 
Council” and contributing to it. Interestingly after issuing White Paper series of 
discussion followed in local media and European academia emphasising fears instigated 
by Germany's increased ambitions as a global player including active utilisation of 
military assets for its foreign and domestic policy. 
Germany's support for EU integration expressed in White Paper 2016 
Since 1990's EU became part of Germany’s political culture and ground for rising own 
influence. The White Paper says for Germany EU stands for political stability, security, 
freedom and prosperity, therefore, it is in German national interests to deepen EU 
integration. The White paper precedes that ”only a united and strong Europe will be 
able to effectively shape the global order in a way that reflects the interests of its 
citizens”. Germany formulates argumentation for supporting the increase of EU's 
supranational power. The White Paper argues that the ”importance of the EU for the 
pursuit common European goals will continue to increase”, while individual power and 
influence of large European countries decrease due to the rapidly increasing role played 
by emerging global actors in other parts of the world. In order to exert sustained 
influence in international affairs, EU member states should delegate some of their 
sovereign rights to the EU level. Germany expresses its support to further integration 
process in the area of foreign and security policy. Here is mentioned Germany’s 
participation in developing recently submitted EU's Global Foreign and Security Policy 
Strategy, and declares readiness to empower EU to act in foreign and security policy 
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area. White Paper admits that European Neighbourhood Policy should be 
instrumentalised as a vital instrument to contain instability and crisis in neighbouring 
countries and don’t allow to proliferate it in EU.                                                                                                             
German-Transatlantic cooperation expressed in White Paper 2016 
German-USA relations are discussed within the context of a multi-polar world order 
where power distribution is changing between countries same as between states and 
non-state actors. Germany perceives that US will continue to have an influence on 
international security, however, considering US's economic and political developments 
European countries will be pushed to take on more responsibilities to pursue common 
European security objectives. It rises issue of questioning post-Cold War peace order 
built by European states and the US in the context of Russia's aggressive revisionism 
resulting into the occupation of Crimea. Germany is sure that Russia's actions will have 
negative and far-reaching consequences for Germany and Europe. In the context of 
increased instability, Germany mentions NATO as primary security guarantor 
especially while military build up is taking place in neighbouring countries. White 
Paper mentions that Germany benefits from NATO's strategic nuclear deterrence and 
underlines its support to build missile defence system in response to the threats of 
proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Germany prises NATO's 
acquired ability to participate in international crisis management. It also mentioned its 
contribution to Alliance by introducing Enable and Enhance Initiative (E2I) as part of 
Defence Capacity Building as an instrument for crisis management. Another initiative 
promoted by Germany is Framework Nations Concept (FNC). FNC is a key 
contribution to the European defence cooperation debate which would allow preserving 
European capabilities through sustained cooperation. Nonetheless, German position 
towards NATO is constructive and comprehensive still it is looking to facilitate 
generating synergy out of cooperation with NATO with its unique but primarily military 
instruments and EU which possess a wide range of instruments including diplomacy, 
security, economic, trade, energy and regional development. 
Germany's strategy towards CSDP expressed in White Paper 2016 
White Paper discusses CSDP as a part of foreign and security policy which represents a 
new area of EU's further integration. It emphasises that EU possessing its civilian and 
military means in the framework of CSDP can achieve special effect trough the careful 
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orchestration of the diplomatic, economic, financial, energy and development assets 
since nature of existing and future contingencies requires flexible and comprehensive 
responses. In order to promote CSDP development, Germany is trying to incorporate 
EU's East flank by widening interaction within Weimar Triangle (Germany, France and 
Poland).  Germany proposes to intensify permanent structured cooperation referring to 
Treaty of Lisbon (Article 42(6) and 46TEU)  to strengthen NATO’s European pillar.  
To cope with geopolitical shifts and sustain EU's political influence Germany is 
promoting European Security and the Defence Union and proposes to focus at first on 
gradual and concrete refinement of CSDP as agreed previously in 2013, 2015 EU 
councils, at second to engage in permanent structured cooperation as defined in Treaty 
of Lisbon, At third intensive interaction based on bilateral and multilateral relations in 
defence policy between EU states finally increased capabilities in NATO’s European 
pillar. Germany is convinced to establish European Security and the Defence Union 
must be developed three areas of CSDP those are: ”the enhancement of its structures, 
the integration of civilian and military capabilities and strengthening European defence 
industry”. Germany calls for harmonisation of capabilities achieving interoperable, 
coherent, comprehensive set of European capabilities by using multinational solutions 
coupled with EDA to launch projects. Germany intends to establish permanent civil-
military operational headquarter with civil-military planning and command and control 
capability. Importantly European defence industry is the focus of the White Paper 
discussed in the context of CSDP empowerment. The White paper emphasies the 
neccessity to developing competitive defence industry to support development of 
European security.” Germany is convinced about the need to consolidate European 
defence industries and invite EU Commission, EDA and key partners to facilitate 
Europeanization of defence industries and harmonisation of arms export guidelines. For 
the same reason, the German government is committed to support key national 
technologies which are based on Bundeswehr requirements and make them available for 
export. White paper provided 14 points comprehensive strategy of the German 
government in relation to CSDP and the European Defence Union.   
This comprehensive approach illustrates Germany's dedication to supporting CSDP 
nonetheless its NATO engagement is substantial. 
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CHAPTER4 
Synthesis 
The realism offers us instruments to discuss incentives/pressures derived from the 
international structure and neoclassical realism empowers us to discuss domestic 
settings that are important factors to be accounted in the assessment of differences 
between the Britain, France and Germany. Nonetheless, all three states are sharing 
many commonalities still their Global and European aspirations are results of different 
structural and domestic settings.  Here we will make a synthesis of findings in analytical 
part combine them with global or domestic issues and summarise as causes for their 
particular choices in respect of global role aspiration, support to EU integration or 
transatlantic cooperation. 
4.1 Differences in Global Role Aspiration 
a. International settings 
The Britain, France and Germany are western European democratic states playing 
important role in international politics. They are members of NATO, EU, OSCE, 
Council of Europe, Group of 7 and Group of 20 also they are part of Treaty of Non- 
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapon. Britain and France are permanent members of UN 
Security Council while Germany is active aspirant on the same position. Membership of 
those organisations provides privileges and constraining responsibilities as well.         
The Britain traditionally is perceived to be strong Atlanticist, its policy preference is 
based on its privileged relationship with the US and its key role in NATO. This factor is 
underpinned not only by structural incentives and favourable relative power dynamic 
but by domestic settings as well. However, such preference creates dichotomy more 
Atlanticist means less Europeanist. The Britain's cooperation within transatlantic 
framework combined with increasing material power offered to it advantageous position 
globally. It became coupled with the US as its strategic ally, however, directly affected 
by Washington's foreign policy distancing it from European aspirations and EU 
integration. Thus, Britain's cooperation with other states including its European partners 
in security sphere is strongly affected with its transatlantic cooperation framework31. 
                                                          
31 Post WWII developed cooperation including the US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement the ground for nuclear 
cooperation and UK-USA mutual agreement for cooperation in signals intelligence so-called Five Eye agreement 
incorporating Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom and the United States. This format of cooperation 
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Transatlantic cooperation provides the strong ground for the US-UK dominance in 
Europe hence pushing France and Britain to occupy the opposing position and engage in 
soft balancing to defend European integration. Thus the Britain’s vital interest is to 
maintain existing system intact by counterbalancing and obstructing anything which is 
perceived to be damaging to the UK-US interests and CSDP is one of it. For example, 
we bring the UK's negative role in 2014 negotiation to increase member states 
contribution into Athena mechanism which is an instrument to finance civilian missions 
and common costs for military operations within CSDP framework (Novaky,2016). The 
Britain's actions against European integration happening not only for the US-UK 
dominance but also due to existing permissive domestic conditions and division within 
EU as well. In Asia the Britain is represented by Five Powers Defence Arrangement 
between UK, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore, this framework also 
having military implications provides ground for exerting its influence in south Asia 
and Pacific. Finally, should be mentioned Commonwealth of Nations incorporating 52 
former members of British Empire and establishing a ground for their multifaceted 
cooperation including trade. As we already see the UK has broad presence globally 
involving trade diplomacy and military, however, maintaining its position within EU 
was important precondition to stay relevant for the Europe and US equally otherwise the 
Britain will lose its unique role to be the US’s bridge to Europe and expectedly will 
affect European power balance. To mitigate expecting decrease of influence in Europe 
as a result of BREXIT the Britain energetically started increasing its role as Europe’s 
important security actor by participation in capability building in the Baltic States and 
Poland. 
France's bilateral and multilateral commitments are extensive as well, however, it is 
perceived to be the epitome of the European state. France's location and ideology in 
contrast to the Britain’s provides a strong impetus for its European leadership. 
Traditionally France was occupied by the idea of united Europe thus France is 
Europeanist however its opposition to Atlanticism is complex phenomena. Britain's and 
France's complex structure of international relations demands and facilitates active 
                                                                                                                                                                          
provides ground for major English-speaker states to gather and share intelligence which is utterly important in the 
information age. However, nature of existing cooperation prevents member states to share intelligence information 
and technologies to the third party or invite another member state without the consent of all parties. Another 
constraint for Britain appears in regards to UK-US defence agreement the Britain is incentivized to keep close ties 
with the US to ensure own nuclear deterrence which is mainly based on the US trident missiles. 
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participation and increased global stance. France has a strong presence in Africa, South 
Asia and enhancing its reach in Gulf region. The post-Cold War relative power dynamic 
gave impetus to France's foreign policy gradually pushing forward on the European 
stage. However, established global unipolarity with the US domination and European 
security challenges pressured France to at first, balance its own European aspirations 
with transatlantic engagement and at second develop a strategy how to balance US 
power in Europe. The US-UK pivot domination in Europe causes French discontent 
since De Gaulle, however, it realises that transatlantic partnership is a necessary 
measure for European security taking into account EU's internal division and 
underdeveloped defence capabilities. For this reason, France in a delicate way to not 
alienate major security ally aligns with Germany which is major European economic 
driver to conduct soft balancing. The Franco-German block is promoting EU integration 
which is perceived to be the example of soft balance (Oswald.2006). Another way to 
balance US power in Europe is taking more share on own security in NATO and 
investing into CSDP development as well (Oswald.2006). However, France maintains 
the close partnership with the transatlantic alliance in case if there will be a necessity to 
hard balance Russia’s expansion threatening European order. An additional incentive 
for the Britain's and Frances global role aspiration is possession of overseas/foreign 
territories. The Britain has 14 France 13 overseas/foreign territories. Those territories of 
Britain and France are scattered over the world mostly in Atlantic, Pacific and the 
Indian Ocean bringing them strategic importance. Those territories have very different 
level of sovereignty and institutional arrangements, however, London and Paris retain 
defence and foreign relation authority. This aspect pressures them to formulate own 
foreign and defence policy in wider horizon and level up their global role. Nonetheless, 
France has high global ambitions same as the Britain it lacks important structural 
incentive as namely privileged relations with superpower which would empower its 
ambitions. Therefore France's and Britain's global ambitions are similarly high but to 
implement those aspirations they have different conditions.                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
As a result of the collapse of Communist block and Unification, most of the 
international structural constraints were reduced. Germany was given chance for the self 
assertion in a  environment. As a result of Unification Germany’s relative power 
increased significantly offering opportunities to achieve its foreign and security policy 
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goals at least in long term (Duffield 1998). Germany became an active participant in 
international politics gradually after falling of Berlin Wall underpinned by power 
dynamic and popular support, it aspires permanent membership of Security Council. 
Germany is balanced Europeanist and Atlanticist pursuing pragmatic foreign policy. It 
has extensive bilateral relations, taking the active role in transatlantic relations, 
Germany is intensifying its engagement in the Middle East, Maghreb, Afghanistan, 
Asia, Africa and Latin America. However, its foreign policy focus encircles at first 
European affairs and after extra-continental. Germany is a major driving power of 
European integration trying to facilitate coherence in foreign and security policy. 
Germany acknowledges the importance of maintaining good transatlantic relations, 
however, it is willing to promote European integration. For this reason, Germany is 
aligning with France to increase European leverage against the US interference in 
European affairs and mitigate Britain's constraining effect. Germany already voiced its 
support to the idea of the creation of European armed forces under control of EU 
parliament that would facilitate the solution of security related threats and eventually 
will increase of European influence. 
b. European Security                                                                                                
European security landscape significantly changed after the end of Cold War, 
subsequently disappeared threat of major nuclear war. That caused structural incentives 
of the Western block until the Balkan crisis has erupted, since then Europe is facing the 
different type of security threats as local, low intensity protracted crisis, intermingled 
with terrorism which could be easily extrapolated in European capitals. Another threat 
of Russia's aggressive revisionism can become a serious concern for Europe. As a 
matter of fact, the US is not willing to engage in existing and emerging crisis in Europe 
and its immediate neighbourhood leaving it on Europeans unless either its own interest 
are not endangered or major war will not burst out threatening of existing order. The 
structural pressures in regards to security induced European capitals to start thinking 
about own instrument to deal with security since primary European security instrument 
NATO is influenced by Washington, therefore it may be also less willing to engage in 
particular crisis and spend US taxpayers money, that became another reason for soft 
balancing US power in Europe. In this situation European military might plays role thus 
Britain and France are main role players while Germany is considerably constrained 
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moving on secondary roles sometimes using chequebook diplomacy without combat 
engagement. However, we witnessed that in absence of NATO and US interests France 
depending on own capabilities intervened in Mali and Chad its former colonies to 
resolve growing crisis. However, later it managed to bring CSDP missions on the 
ground. Here we conclude that security threats can create structural pressures, 
depending on their origin and scale inducing the US and NATO's fully/limited 
engagement or induce Europeans to take care of themselves. In that case, Britain's role 
is defined by many variables among them position of Washington and particular case 
that defines who will be in lead. France's role importantly increases as having 
interventionist posture while Germany's role decreases due to constraining domestic 
settings. 
c. Domestic settings 
The National capacity of the Britain and France are more or less similar taking in 
account population, life expectancy, GDP and prospects of economic growth according 
to World Bank data, military power are almost even. Germany is a leader among them 
but inferior in military power. 
The Britain’s and France’s national capacity combined with political culture were 
always supportive to exert their influence beyond own metropolis to conquer important 
territories acquire political and material benefits. This factor became a hallmark of a 
current political culture which even today defines foreign policy and stimulates 
ambitious global posture. Germany in contrast due to its location and size always was 
the European centre of gravity. Due to its negative historical experience, Germany 
chose to constrain its global ambitions by its constitution. 
National governments played important role in developing global ambitions. As Rose 
suggests foreign policy outcome is the result of variation of relative power interfered by 
leaders' interpretation of systemic incentives and by the support of population (Rose, 
1998). The political leaders of the Britain, France and Germany in early 90’s interpreted 
systemic changes as beneficial opportunities. Britain’s Labor party with Prime Minister 
Tony Blair acquired population support by promoting idea of bringing changes in the 
Britain, thus he was devoted to bringing new stream domestically, moreover material 
power existed at the moment allowed Blair to shape foreign policy that would prove its 
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effectiveness taking some unorthodox for Britain decisions as deeper engagement with 
EU. In contrast, David Cameron’s Conservative government was struggling to stabilise 
own economy after 2008 financial crisis which had the profound effect on public 
opinion developing fertile ground for Euro-skepticism. Moreover, the Euro-skepticism 
was well rooted inside of Conservatives that allowed UKIP to aggregate and voice anti-
EU feelings in front of a domestic and European audience. Therefore British domestic 
discontent induced to formulate foreign policy in relation to EU which eventually led to 
the breakup. After BREXIT vote new hastily formed government is left with the task to 
rule out difficult divorce, therefore recent government's input in increasing Britain's 
global ambitions are less in contrast to Labor government in 1997. Moreover, future EU 
exit process is promising to be expensive bringing economic losses subsequently 
downgrading the Britain's relative power, therefore its Prime Minister T. May's 
government's global ambitions at the moment is moderate do not match to the notion 
expressed in the SSN SDR 2015.                                                                                                         
The French government of J. Chirac inherited the country with high unemployment, 
increasing debt, disorientated electorate and a sense of political stagnation. Those 
factors played pressuring role to launch extensive reforms and assure nation to put 
France on track to its glory. Power dynamic and domestic factors affected Frances 
foreign policy demanding active foreign political position. In addition, the shift of the 
US strategic imperatives into Asia-Pacific created an opportunity for France to exert its 
influence in Europe and in South neighbourhood. The recent government of Francois 
Holland inherited multiple crises established in Europe and domestically. In this 
situation, the only solution was to strengthen European position under the Franco-
German leadership to withstand external and internal pressure and increase pro-
European power balance. That strategy has a positive effect on the crisis increased their 
influence and acquired positive international and domestic perceptions. Taking into 
account above-mentioned factors we conclude that external and domestic incentives 
played an important role in Foreign policy pursued by both presidents J. Chirac same as 
F. Holland establishing high global role aspiration but sustaining their European 
position.  
In the case of Germany different set of factors affecting its moderate global ambitions 
expressed in foreign policy. The government of Chancellor Helmut Kohl Christian 
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Democrat Union (CDU, 1982-1998) was an active driver of many European initiations, 
however, the Unification of FRG and GDR was his primary task. The unification 
process required time, commitment and resources. This process lasted from 1990 to 
1995, German government paid about 15,550 billion Deutsche Marks equal to € 7,950, 
59 billion to Russia for withdrawal of former Soviet forces32. However, the investments 
made by Germany during unification were much more. Recent German government 
under Chancellor Angela Merkel inherited different situation, Germany's stable 
domestic situation with increasing economy is affected by multiple European crises 
threatening by the major disarray of the EU. Thus Germany as central in Europe is 
forced to absorb leading position together with France and ensure European unity and 
coherence. The popular support for policy's implemented by Chancellor Merkel 
government and Germany's role in EU predisposes to resurrect German identity as a 
European leader.  The Same argument is reinforced by bringing an example of stating 
its ambition to take place in Security Council as a permanent member in former and 
recent White Papers. Consequently, the German government is playing an important 
driving role to formulate Germany's foreign ambition in support of European integration 
more than ever, based on material power country possess and popular support. 
The different system incentives/pressures, power dynamics and popular support affect 
national governments to different foreign ambitions. In the 90s international structural 
incentives triggered all three states to support ESDP initiation. However, during last 
decade international and domestic situation pushed Britain in opposite direction. In 
contrast, similar international changes caused France and Germany maintains support to 
CSDP deeper development. The Franco-German alliance is demonstrating strong 
leadership focused on achieving EU unity, coherence to stabilize situation and promote 
integration which in turn eliminates insecurity, assures domestic stability and promotes 
global position. In contrast, Britain's leadership in an existing situation while lacking 
popular support, expecting to sustain material power degradation pursues introvert 
policy and has much obscured global ambitions interpreted in its foreign policy. 
Based on conducted study we formulate our inference in regards to hypothesis one 
which stated: “Country that has high global aspirations is less likely to increase its 
                                                          
32 German White Paper, 1994, 112-113 
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commitment to a supranational institution in order to preserve own freedom of action in 
foreign and security dimension”. The international structural incentives, relative power 
dynamics and domestic settings play a decisive role in formulating policies towards the 
supranational institution. As we already witnessed Britain having high global aspiration 
in 90’s supported ESDP, France having high global aspiration still supports CSDP, 
while Germany supports it to increase its own global role. Therefore we state that 
hypothesis one could be sustainable only with the constellation of certain international 
and domestic conditions. 
4.2 Differences in Supports to EU Integration Process 
The UK’s support to EU integration process is traditionally insubstantial, its basic 
reasons joining EEC were absolutely mercantile, the Britain was newer obsessed with 
idea that European Economic Community in the future would become a global political 
player. Moreover, the Britain is ideologically Atlanticist therefore not Europeanist. The 
structural pressures caused by the collapse of Soviet Union induced Britain to stay 
closer to EU to avoid pitching especially in the 1990s until world political picture has 
become clear. In addition, T. Blairs' European aspirations played an important role to 
get closer to EU. Consequently, its engagement into European ESDP development was 
the best way to stay on leading position and steer up the process from inside. Over time 
EU's political and economic influence increased causing Britain’s concerns. Franco-
German tandem supporting European integration process made possible of rising EU’s 
supranational power subsequently putting in question Britain’s fundamental value of 
own sovereignty and therefore its leading position. The interpretation of rising EU 
supranational power in London was in stunning contrast to the Britain’s political culture 
which is based on possessing sovereignty associated with a monarchy the bedrock for a 
united country and with British material and ideational possessions. Submission of 
British sovereignty in favour of increasing EU supranational power is absolutely 
unacceptable for any political party and nation itself influencing the British leader’s 
decisions. Another concern has developed gradually due to an increase of EU's relative 
power Franco-German block started soft balancing the US which was seen in economy 
foreign and security policy. Because of those reasons Britain’s attitude toward EU 
integration is negative since it means delegating more supranational power and reducing 
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own sovereignty and degradation of the US-UK pivot dominance. CSDP deepening 
would increase EU's supranational power in foreign, security and defence policy area 
totally contradicting Britain's national interests.  
Frances support of EU integration process is much higher than the Britain's, France is 
traditionally European state promoting European values. It supports the rise of 
European influence, however, prefers the intergovernmental format of relations rather 
than delegating all powers to EU and contributing to its supranational clout. France 
always has been a country with centralised power (monarchy, the presidency) in 
contrast of prevailed federalism in Germany. France benefits from own initiation of 
Common Agriculture Policy, it actively participated in EMU and Schengen zone 
agreement and supported CFSP and ESDP development.  It has an influence on EU 
Energy market trough third Energy Package regulation and can influence on energy 
providers like Russia or Africa. Support of EU integration is the best way to reduce US 
grip on Europe, defence integration over CSDP means defence industry and market 
development, France already benefited from joint armament projects and it will get 
more if there will be united European approach to this issue. However, principal 
differences between the French and British governments patronising national defence 
industries makes it hard to negotiate a common position.   
Germany’s support of EU integration process is traditionally strong as being central 
European country. Its domestic predisposition is supporting Germany's contribution to 
increasing EU's supranational power since traditions of federalism is strong today as 
well. Germany same as France is main European driver, it was the initiator of EMU 
introducing Euro also it actively supported Schengen zone agreement, it supported 
enlargement process and neighbourhood policy development. Since fall of Berlin wall 
and reshuffle of European order, Germany started supporting the development of 
European security and defence agenda including the idea of European Army under EU's 
supranational authority (under EU parliament control). For Germany increase of EU's 
world influence is proportional of increasing own influence.  Developing of EU's 
foreign, security and defence instruments means bringing stability in EU's 
neighbourhood where the US and NATO neglect to engage. We already witnessed 
Germany's ability to mobilise and direct EU in the resolution of Eurozone crisis or 
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stepping in promoting sanctions against Russia in the response to annexation of Crimea 
as a result dramatically increasing its European and global influence.  
Germany supports further European integration in the area of CSDP in order to achieve 
the goal of establishing common European defence union to acquire more instruments 
for security, autonomy from the US hegemony and increase Europe’s global influence. 
Based on above discussed we can prove our hypothesis refereeing on Britain VS France 
and Germany that as higher is state’s integration into EU on the example of France and 
Germany as more is its support for deeper CSDP development.  
4.3 Differences in Transatlantic Cooperation 
The UK- US cooperation has its complex underpinnings, sentimental attachment to the 
English-speaking peoples and the Anglo-Saxon heritage has established a foundation 
for the US-UK friendship. Cooperation in nuclear, military, intelligence, diplomacy and 
technology makes those two countries closest transatlantic allies. Washington-London 
pivot which is strongly bound in many areas makes it nearly impossible to dissolve their 
special relationship without serious harm to the own political position. Due to the fact 
that US’s often undertakes unilateral steps concerning security in European 
neighbourhood increases Europeans discontent which is left to deal with aftershock like 
in the case of Iraq. Since the UK is strongly coupled with the US this factor 
automatically places it into opposing camp. Washington perceives CSDP as a 
counterbalance to the US power, counterproductive to NATO and harmful for its 
transatlantic relations (Sloan, 2000). The UK prefers to support NATO as an 
unquestioned instrument of European security and maintain existing relationship with 
the US than facilitating CSDP development. Taking in account fact that NATO is the 
only instrument for Europe with a wide range of capabilities where the US holds 
superior position and it is capable of responding to Russian threat in contrast of 
underdeveloped CSDP with complicated decision-making system, makes another 
reasonable argument why UK is not interested in supporting and investing into CSDP 
development. 
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France–US cooperation has a 200-year history, nature of relations is friendly and 
cooperative. White Papers discussing the US within several contexts: as a strategic 
partner within the wider framework of security related issues and as major EU trade 
partner. France-US, bilateral cooperation includes trade, military, nuclear and space. 
Within the framework of Alliance to fight ISIL two countries signed in Washington 
2016 Joint Statement of Intent- including close cooperation to fight security related 
issues in Sahel and the Middle East their mutual cooperation included several areas of 
mutual interest as operational intelligence, space, cyber, nuclear, biological, and 
chemical defence33. Another agreement signed is The Military Space Cooperation 
Arrangement34 followed to Framework Agreement in the Exploration and Use of Outer 
Space for Peaceful Purposes 2007. This agreement provided ground to extend their 
cooperation and sign an additional agreement for establishing space surveillance 
framework- Agreement on Cooperation in Space Situation Awareness 2011 35. In 
addition to White Paper trade and investment between the United States and France are 
substantial. The US is the top destination for French investment and the United States is 
the largest foreign investor in France.36 Nonetheless, France’s does not support the US 
hegemony over Europe still in the wider framework it supported the US in first Gulf 
war, in the Afghanistan. France supports US operations in Sahel and Middle East even 
today as a political ally of a superpower.  
France-NATO relations differ time to time in 90s France was out of Alliance's military 
structure, however, acknowledging the need to join back. New 2015 White Paper 
describes NATO as primary security instrument and takes a realistic approach towards 
EU's CSDP considering stumbling blocks to its deeper development. France is 
expecting that sooner NATO will take a decisive role in crisis response operations 
rather than EU's CSDP framework will become capable of doing so. France places 
NATO and EU as complementary to each other allowing dealing with wide range of 
contingencies and threats. France realises that none of them is ideally fit to respond to 
                                                          
33 US Department of Defence Joint Statement of Intent. 
https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/Joint-Statement-of-Intent-between-the-US-and-
France.pdf 
34 US Department of Defence, U.S., France Signe Bilateral Cooperation Agreements.,  
https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1014192/us-france-sign-bilateral-cooperation-agreements 
35 Space News.  France, U.S. Sign Framework Agreement for Space Surveillance Cooperation.  
http://spacenews.com/france-us-sign-framework-agreement-space-surveillance-cooperation/ 
36 U.S. Census, Foreign Trade, Trade with France. https://www.census.gov/foreign-
trade/balance/c4279.html 
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recent security problems, therefore, should be instrumentalized best available options in 
response to particular challenges. 
Germany-US cooperation counting its history since 1790, recently they are friendly and 
cooperative. The US played an important role for Germany since the end of WWII, 
recently Germany's power increased, however, the US still has its presence in the wider 
context of security and stability of Germany and Europe. Moreover, in a situation when 
Russia put under question rules based Euro-Atlantic order established since WWII  
Germany agrees that Europe must take more responsibility for own security. In addition 
to white paper, US-Germany has extensive trade relations which are not discussed in the 
document. In 2015, the US became Germany’s fourth largest supplier of goods and the 
leading export market. Moreover, the German firms employ over 670,000 American 
workers. Together, German and American companies offer more than one million jobs 
on both sides of the Atlantic.37  Nonetheless, Germany has most developed trade 
relations with the US this condition does not play role in supporting European security 
system development. 
Germany is becoming an increasingly important member of NATO it promotes different 
initiatives to achieve synergy by harmonising planning, training and acquisition of 
capabilities. It supports NATO's partner countries capability building trough the 
different initiatives. It also supports NATO’s deterrence building including missile 
defence and proposes a constructive dual approach to Russian threat. Germany supports 
an approach that there are areas where NATO supposed to work together with EU to 
achieve a greater effect. Germany is admitting that NATO has transformed to address 
the various security-related crises which are a positive factor, however, it acknowledges 
that CSDP needs more extensive development in order to be an effective instrument for 
Europeans together with NATO.  
In response to hypothesis three, we state that according to analysis Transatlantic 
framework represents indispensable security instrument for the Britain, France and 
Germany equally currently same as before. Moreover, NATO security umbrella 
provides a condition for Britain, France and Germany to pursue their global ambitions 
reducing their vulnerability. Unless the Alliance represents indispensable security 
                                                          
37U.S Department of State. U.S. relations with Germany, factsheet. 
https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3997.htm 
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instrument where traditional power distribution guarantees effective decision-making 
and coherence it will remain a preferable option for its members. NATO's 
transformative ability in the response to modern security challenges creates a condition 
where further CSDP development could be assessed as an unnecessary duplication of 
capabilities or effort that contradicts to principles of transatlantic cooperation. However, 
the modern security landscape uncovers areas, where NATO’s capabilities are limited 
by different settings and EU's format is more appropriate. In response to Russia's 
revisionism policy, NATO focused on a military buildup in the frontline region, while 
EU instrumentalized sanctions against Russia as its political lever. In Ukraine-EU 
conducts Advisory Mission to assist the Ukrainian authorities in the sustainable reform 
of civilian security sector while NATO's active engagement in Ukraine would cause 
aggressive reciprocal activities from Russia's side. 
 In this work we disprove hypothesis 3 “As far the transatlantic framework provides for 
EU states security guarantees and possibility to benefit from a privileged relationship 
with the US less will be their support to deeper CSDP development". by inference that 
as long the US maintains its hegemonic position in NATO dictating its policy principles 
as reasonable will be building capable CSDP framework. 
4.4 Differences in Strategies towards CSDP 
The states strategies towards ESDP/ CSDP differ in its support level and substance. The 
UK's position towards EU in general explicated in SDR 1998 does not reflect any 
supporting attitude or strategy at all. Later in 2015 the UK SDR already expresses its 
attitude which could be characterised as negative towards CSDP. Britain in recent 
documents in the wake of Euro-skepticism became focused on expanding its bilateral 
relations with France and Germany in security and defence area rather than use CSDP's 
multilateral framework. Moreover, we already discussed main reasons why Britain is 
obstructing CSDP deeper development. At first, because it will cause an increase of 
EU's supranational power in the expense of sovereignty.  At second CSDP is perceived 
to be an instrument to balance US dominance in Europe.  
France in contrast to Britain is supportive Chirac in his Defence Strategic reform 1996 
offers French forces to Europe as defence arm. This situation is absolutely different in 
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recent White Paper which is explicating more precise proposals to reinitialize CSDP. 
France calls for the more active role of EEAS, it intends to facilitate EU's national 
parliaments and EU parliament open discussion over CSDP in order to facilitate public 
understanding of strategic challenges. It proposes the creation of EU White Paper to 
promote the EU’s interests and strategic objectives. France encourages member states to 
fight emerging crisis pockets in Africa, Middle East, in Caucasus and Balkans-Kosovo. 
France proposes to establish close cooperation between NATO and EDA facilitating 
European defence industry within smart defence and pooling and sharing programs. 
Soon after issuing recent White Paper France brought on European Council initiative to 
increase common costs for military operations within Athena mechanism. Unfortunately 
EU member states were not coherent on this issue and the Britain easily opposed this 
initiative (Novaky, 2016). That example illustrated the weakness of the existing 
decision-making system, however, after BREXIT there will be more permissive 
conditions to push through new initiatives contributing to CSDP development.  
Germany from the beginning expresses its support to common European defence policy. 
Germany's strategy towards European security and defence on early stages included 
close cooperation with France establishing Franco-German alliance. Recent document 
express more precise strategy. It facilitates CSDP development by attracting East 
European Atlanticist state Poland and promoting it within Weimar Triangle format 
including Germany France and Poland. It facilitated and consulted EEAS for EU's 
Foreign and Security Policy development. It proposed to intensify permanent and 
structured cooperation between member states. Germany promotes European Security 
and Defence Union based on CSDP which should undertake extensive “enhancement of 
structure, the integration of civilian and military capabilities and strengthen European 
defence industry”. Germany is intending to establish CSDP's civil-military command 
and control capability.  Germany proposes to undertake practical actions to facilitate the 
consolidation of European defence industries together with EU Commission, EDA and 
other key partners. It intends also harmonisation of arms export guidelines in EU. 
At the end we can state that Britain’s initial impulsive engagement has been watered 
down quickly and recently its support to CSDP is insubstantial. France and Germany 
were amongst engines of CSDP from the beginning and recently as well, this effort will 
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make possible of EU defence integration and create a strong ground to balance US 
unilateral policy in regards to Europe and its neighbourhood. France and Germany are 
intending comprehensive revitalization of CSDP after the Britain leaves Union.  
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Conclusion 
Based on conducted study we can consolidate several reasons creating the impediments 
to European Common Security and Defence Policy deeper development resulting into 
common European defence. Before concluding our research we illustrate major 
divergences:  
Atlantic is (UK, Germany) VS Europeanist (France, Germany) 
Globalist (UK, France) VS Regionalist (Germany) 
Intergovernmentalist (UK, France)  VS Federalist (Germany) 
Interventionist (France, UK) VS Civilian (Germany) 
Permissive domestic settings(UK, France) VS Constraining domestic settings(Germany) 
 
European order established after WWII allowed to the USA to absorb hegemonic power 
in Europe and dominate in its foreign and security issues. Europe’s primary security 
instrument NATO represents Washington's instrument to proliferate its interests in 
Europe preventing the emergence of alternative security mechanisms. Post-Cold War 
reality introduced unipolar world with the US superpower. However, unipolarity is the 
less sustainable triggering emergence of other regional poles. The emergence of EU as 
European power pole is reality and development of own foreign, security and defence 
nature is the matter of time.The Washinton percieves CSDP to be an instrument to 
balance US power in Europe threatening existing order. For this reason, US either 
neglected or resisted Europeans initiatives and attempts to take control of own foreign 
and security policy beyond NATO framework, position voiced by M. Albright is one 
example of it. To maintain a strong grip on European affairs US relies on its closest 
European ally the UK which prevents establishing Franco-German counterbalance core 
in Europe. Therefore CSDP deeper development will be obstructed until US hegemonic 
power tends to maintain its presence in Europe in the same position.  
As a fact, security and defence matters always were a directory of high politics where 
states were not willing to seize their sovereignty in favour of increasing supranational 
capability of EU. As our case study illustrates the increasing  EU's supranational clout 
caused repulsive reaction of the UK. The development of CSDP is framed within 
intergovernmental scopes and demands the unanimous decision of European Council38 
                                                          
38 Article 42 section 2 TEU  
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where many different interests of Member States are colliding.  Thus achieving 
cohesion among other member states is the primary challenge for France and Germany. 
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